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ABSTRACT
We analyze optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in an economy with distortionarylabor income
taxes, nominal rigidities and nominal debt of various maturities. Optimal policy prescribes the
exclusive use of long term debt. Such debt mitigates the distortions associated with hedging
ﬁscal shocks by allowing the government to allocate them eﬃciently across states and periods.
I. Introduction
Governments have traditionally ﬁnanced deﬁcits by selling nominal bonds of varied maturities.
A long standing policy question concerns the optimal management of such liabilities. Various
contributors have posited a role for short term nominal debt. Campbell (1995) argues that a
cost-minimizing government should respond to a steeply sloped nominal yield curve by shortening
the maturity structure since high yield spreads tend to predict high expected bond returns in the
future. Barro (1997) emphasizes tax smoothing considerations. He asserts that governments can
reduce their risk exposure and better smooth taxes by shortening the maturity structure when the
inﬂation process becomes more volatile and persistent. Barro characterizes the reduction in the
average maturity of US Federal bonds between 1946 and 1976 as an optimal response to changes in
the inﬂation process. Both lines of argument treat the processes for inﬂation and nominal interest
rates exogenously.
In this paper, we explore optimal maturity management in a fully speciﬁed general equilibrium
model. We identify a motive for issuing long term nominal debt and give calibrated examples in
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1which there is exclusive use of the longest term nominal debt available. In these examples, the
management of nominal interest rates departs from the Friedman rule. A switch from a favorable
to an unfavorable ﬁscal environment, triggered by an adverse shock1 is followed by increases in
current and future short term nominal interest rates, with increases in the latter concentrated in
future adverse shock states. When a spell of adverse ﬁscal shocks begins, the yield curve takes a
corresponding humped shape, with the hump occurring at the longest traded debt maturity. It
reverts to a lower level and a ﬂatter shape when this spell ends or when the debt outstanding at the
beginning of the spell has matured. Optimal policy implies that long term nominal debt is riskier
than short term debt. However, the volatility of long term debt returns is deliberate and managed
so as to hedge the ﬁscal risk the government faces. The risk premium on this debt resembles
an insurance premium paid by the government; it does not provide a motive for shortening the
maturity structure.
Since our focus is the management of the nominal maturity structure, we consider an economy in
which households are borrowing-constrained and can only buy non-contingent nominal debt. This
assumption implies that the government must hedge ﬁscal shocks indirectly through contempora-
neous inﬂations or variations to the nominal term structure. Following Siu (2004), we introduce
two nominal rigidities that enrich the government’s policy problem.2 First, we assume that some
ﬁrms set their prices before the realization of the current state. This rigidity implies that contem-
poraneous innovations to inﬂation are associated with costly misallocations of production across
ﬁrms. The government must trade such distortions oﬀ against the hedging beneﬁts that inﬂation
innovations provide. Second, we assume that households face a cash-in-advance constraint applied
to some goods (cash goods), but not others (credit goods). Variations in the nominal term structure
imply positive short term nominal interest rates after some histories and, hence, misallocations of
consumption across cash and credit goods. The government must trade the hedging beneﬁts of
these variations oﬀ against the consumption distortions they induce.
Absent borrowing constraints on households, an allocation in the neighborhood of the optimal
complete markets one can be implemented by taking arbitrarily large positions in debt markets.
With these constraints in place, such positions are no longer possible and the hedging of risk requires
more substantial movements in inﬂation and nominal interest rates. We use a simple example with
a single shock to isolate an advantage of long term debt in this case: it allows the government to
1Here, adverse ﬁscal shocks comprise positive shocks to government spending and negative shocks to productivity.
2Absent these rigidities all hedging could be achieved through contemporaneous adjustments in inﬂation and
nominal debt would eﬀectively function as a real contingent claim. See, for example, Chari et al (1991).
2postpone the costly positive interest rates used to hedge shocks. As noted, calibrated numerical
examples indicate that the government relies almost exclusively on the longest term debt available.
Such debt permits the postponement of positive nominal interest rates and their concentration
in states where they can contribute to the hedging of multiple past shocks. Such postponement
and concentration eﬀects underpin a gradual upward response of short term nominal interest rates
during spells of adverse ﬁscal shocks.
The literature on optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy has made various assumptions about the
asset structure confronting the government. Our paper is closest to Siu (2004). We follow him
in restricting the government to the use of nominal debt and incorporating frictions that render
state-contingent inﬂations distortionary. In contrast to Siu, we allow the government to trade
nominal debt of more than one period maturity. Thus, we are able to consider the optimal maturity
structure. Additionally, in our model the government can inﬂuence the price of outstanding nominal
bonds via current and future nominal interest rate policy. This opens up a second channel for
hedging ﬁscal shocks that is absent in Siu’s earlier contribution.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Sections II and III describe the environment and charac-
terize competitive allocations. Section IV gives the Ramsey problem for our economy and contrasts
it with those obtained under alternative asset market structures. Section V identiﬁes a motive for
using long term debt in a simple example, while Section VI provides a general recursive formulation.
Section VII uses this formulation to obtain optimal policy in calibrated economies.
II. A model with sticky prices
The economy is inhabited by inﬁnitely-lived households, ﬁrms and a government. Let st ∈ S =
{  si}N
i=1 denote a period t shock and st ∈ St+1 a t-period history of shocks. We assume that s0
is distributed according to π0 and that subsequently shocks evolve according to a Markov process
with transition π. The implied probability distribution over shock histories st is denoted πt.
A. Households
Preferences Households have preferences over stochastic sequences of cash goods {c1t}∞
t=0, credit
goods {c2t}∞
t=0 and labor {lt}∞





3where U : R2
+×[0,T] → R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the interior of its domain, strictly
concave, strictly increasing in its ﬁrst two arguments and decreasing in its third argument. We
assume that U satisﬁes the Inada conditions for j = 1,2 and each (ci,l), i  = j, limcj→0
∂U
∂cj(c1,c2,l) =
∞ and for each (c1,c2), liml→T
∂U
∂l (c1,c2,l) = −∞. Finally, we assume that U is homothetic in
(c1,c2) and weakly separable in l. Let Ujt, j = 1,2,l denote the derivatives of U with respect to
each of its arguments at date t and let Ujkt, j,k = 1,2,l denote its second derivatives at t.




+, where the superscript k denotes the maturity of the bond and K
is the maximal maturity traded. The shock st is then realized. Asset market trading occurs in
two rounds during the course of the day. The ﬁrst liquidity trading round occurs in the morning
immediately after the shock realization. In this, households are able to liquidate their bond holdings
in light of their post-shock cash needs. On the other side of the market, the government (one may
think of it as the Fed) responds to these needs by trading bonds for money. The household’s budget










t(st)   Bk
t (st), (2)
where Qk
t is the nominal price of the k-th maturity bond, At = B1
t + Mt and   Mt and {   Bk
t }K
k=1
denote the portfolio of money and bonds purchased by households. Households then shop for cash
and credit goods, exert eﬀort in production and receive after-tax wage and dividend income. Since
money is required for cash goods consumption, households face the cash-in-advance constraint:
Pt(st)c1t(st) ≤   Mt(st). (3)
In the afternoon, asset markets reopen allowing households to settle credit balances accrued whilst
shopping and invest income. This second hedging trading round also allows the government (one
may now think of it as the Treasury) to ﬁnance its budget deﬁcit and purchase a portfolio that
hedges itself against future shocks. Deﬁne:   At(st) ≡   B1
t (st) + {  Mt(st) −Pt(st)c1t(st)} −Pt(st)c2t(st)
+(1 − τt(st))It(st). Here Pt is the period t price level, τt is the income tax rate and It is the
household’s nominal income. The latter is given by It = Wtlt +
  1
0 Πi,tdi, where Wt is the nominal
4wage and Πi,t is the nominal proﬁt of intermediate goods ﬁrm i at date t.3 The household’s budget
constraint in the hedging trading round is:
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where   Qk
t denotes the price of a k-maturity bond in this round.
Following Chari and Kehoe (1993), we assume that household participation in bond markets
is anonymous, so that bonds issued by households are unenforceable and no one is willing to buy
them.4 Formally, we assume, for all t, st and k,
Bk
t (st−1) ≥ 0,   Bk
t (st) ≥ 0. (5)
This constraint precludes lending by the government to households in the bond market and we will
refer to it as a no lending constraint. Both the repayment of government loans and the payment of
taxes are transfers to the government. Ramsey models typically assume that the ﬁrst is lump sum,
while the second is not. This distinction is arbitrary. In practice, costs associated with enforcing
repayments and monitoring household eﬀort and productivity are likely to render loan repayments
contingent on observed income or consumption. Hence, they will distort household decisions just
as taxes do. We do not explicitly model such costs, rather we simply rule government loans out.5
Households maximize (1) subject to the constraints for all i, t, cit ≥ 0, lt ∈ [0,T] and (2)- (5).
B. Final goods ﬁrms






it di]µ, µ > 1. Intermediate goods are produced by sticky price ﬁrms who set their price Pst
before st is realized, and ﬂexible price ones who set their price Pft after st is learned. Letting ρ
denote the fraction of sticky price ﬁrms and assuming symmetry across each type of intermediate





Yft and Yst are, respectively, the amount of ﬂexible and sticky price intermediate good used. Final
3We assume that the latter is paid as a dividend to the household. To economize on space and without loss of
generality, we omit a detailed description of the stock market and assume instead that households own a diversiﬁed
and non-tradeable portfolio of shares.
4On the other hand, we do allow households to borrow from local stores to ﬁnance credit good consumption.
5Weaker restrictions on government lending of the form B
k
t (s
t−1) ≥ −B would lead to qualitatively similar results.











− (1 − ρ)Pft(st)Yft(st) − ρPst(st−1)Yst(st). (6)
C. Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods are produced with labor according to the technology: Yit = θtLα
it, where θt(st) =
θ(st), θ : S → R+, is a productivity shock. Substituting this and the demand curves stemming


































The government faces a stochastic process for government spending {Gt}∞
t=0 of the form Gt(st) =
G(st), where G : S → R+. The government ﬁnances its spending by levying taxes on labor
and trading non-contingent nominal bonds. Its budget constraint from the ﬁrst liquidity trading




gt (st−1) ≤   Mt(st) +
 K
k=1 Qk
t(st)   Bk
gt(st), where we use a g
subscript to distinguish elements of the government’s portfolio and Agt = B1
gt + Mt. Its budget
constraint in the second hedging trading round is:   Agt(st) +
 K
k=2   Qk
t(st)   Bk
gt(st) ≤ Agt+1(st) +
 K
k=2   Qk
t(st)Bk
gt+1(st), where   Agt(st) =   Mt(st) +   B1
gt(st) − τt(st)It(st) + Pt(st)G(st).
E. Competitive equilibria and allocations
Deﬁne, respectively, an allocation and an st−1−continuation allocation to be sequences e∞ =
{c1t,c2t,Lf,t,Ls,t}∞
t=0 and e∞(st−1) = {c1t+r(st−1, ),c2t+r(st−1, ),Lft(st−1, ),Lst(st−1, )}∞
r=0.
Deﬁnition 1. {c1t, c2t, lt, Lft, Lst, τt, Wt, Pst+1, Pft, Pt, {Qk
t}K







Mt, {   Bk
t }K
k=1, {   Bk
gt}K
k=1,   Mt}∞
t=0 is a competitive equilibrium at {Ps0, M0, {Bk
0}K
k=1} if each
cit ≥ 0, lt ∈ [0,T] and
1. {c1t,c2t,lt,{Bk
t }K
k=1,Mt,{   Bk
t }K
k=1,   Mt}∞
t=0 solves the household’s problem given {Ps0, M0, {Bk
0}K
k=1};




t=0 solve the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm’s problem; the
price sequences {Pft}∞
t=0 and {Ps,t+1}∞
t=0 solve the intermediate ﬁrms’ problems;
3. the government’s budget constraints hold at each date;
4. the labor, bonds and goods markets clears: ∀t, st, lt = (1−ρ)Lft+ρLst, Bk
t = Bk
gt,   Bk
t =   Bk
gt,





5. the no lending constraints hold: ∀t, st, k, Bk
g,t(st−1) ≥ 0,   Bk
g,t(st) ≥ 0.
e∞ is a competitive allocation if it is part of a competitive equilibrium.
III. Characterizing competitive allocations
Proposition 2 provides a set of conditions that characterize competitive allocations. Before stating
the proposition, we discuss those conditions that are new and refer the reader to Siu (2004) for
further details of the other more standard conditions.
A. Implementability and Measurability constraints
Implementability and measurability constraints are central elements of any dynamic Ramsey taxa-
tion model. We describe and interpret these conditions under our asset market structure and then
contrast them with the corresponding constraints from earlier work.
Primary Surplus Value First, deﬁne the primary surplus value: ξt(st) ≡ Est[
 ∞
j=0 βt+jΛt+j(st+j)],









gives the present discounted value of future primary surpluses accruing to the government after st.
To see this, note that the deﬁnition of Λt, the household’s ﬁrst order conditions, the expression










− 1 is the one period nominal interest rate.









µ . In a competitive
equilibrium, Nt(st) =
Pst(st−1)
Pt(st) and the sequence {Nt} thus describes the shocks to inﬂation implied
by a (competitive) allocation.6
6We formally prove this and other statements made in the current section in the appendix.
7Bond Pricing Deﬁne the sequence {Dk
t+1}K
k=1 by D1







































in which inﬂation shocks are modest and cash goods scare - more heavily.
Portfolio Weights Finally, deﬁne the portfolio weights at(st−1) ≡ At(st−1)/Ps,t(st−1) and
for each k, bk
t(st−1) ≡ Bk
t (st−1)/Ps,t(st−1).
Using this notation, the implementability/measurability constraints are, for all t, st:
ξt(st)
U1t(st)













      
liabilities
. (8)
At date 0, the portfolio weights are predetermined, whereas at dates t > 0 they are chosen as part
of a competitive equilibrium. In the latter case, they are measurable with respect to information
at date t − 1 and (8) places cross state restrictions on the process for ξt. Following Aiyagari et
al (2002), we refer to the date 0 version of (8) as the implementability constraint and to the date
t > 0 versions as measurability constraints. The left and right hand sides of (8) can be interpreted,
respectively, as government primary surplus and liability values8; (8) asserts that these values must
be equal after all histories.
7The inability of households to borrow on bond markets introduces potential indeterminacy in bond prices. We
resolve this by assuming throughout that bond prices are set so that households never wish to borrow. This assumption
does not restrict the set of competitive allocations; it ensures non-negative interest rates at all times.









































8Although the portfolio weights {at, {bk+1
t }K−1
k=1 } are st−1-measurable, variations in the price level
(i.e. in Nt(st)) or the nominal term structure (i.e.
U2t(st)
U1t(st)Dk
t+1(st)) allow the government to adjust
the value of its portfolio in response to and, hence, hedge contemporaneous shocks. However, this
hedging comes at a cost, Nt(st) and
U2t(st)
U1t(st)Dk
t+1(st) terms also capture the distortions associated
with innovations to the price level or term structure. If events at t induce ﬂexible price ﬁrms to alter
their prices relative to their previously expected level, then Nt(st) departs from 1 and an ineﬃcient





k=1 also departs from 1 and the short run nominal interest rate must
exceed zero either now or in some future state. This results in a misallocation of consumption
across cash and credit goods as households seek to economize on their use of cash.
B. Comparison with Existing Models
The key diﬀerence between our model and others becomes apparent in the measurability constraints.
We contrast our version of these conditions with those in the less restrictive environment of Lucas
and Stokey (1983) and the more restrictive ones of Siu (2004) and Aiyagari et al (2002).
In the model of Lucas and Stokey, the government can trade real state contingent debt, and so
the analogue of (8) is:
ξt(st)/U1t(st) = at(st). (9)
The portfolio weight at is st-measurable so that (9), unlike (8), does not represent a collection of
cross state restrictions. Except at date 0, when a0(s0) is ﬁxed, the constraints in (9) are redundant.
On the other hand, in Siu (2004), nominal debt of only one period is traded and (8) reduces to:
ξt(st)/U1t(st) = Nt(st)at(st−1). (10)
Thus,
ξt(st)
U1t(st) can be varied across states st only through contemporaneous inﬂation shocks Nt(st).
Since there is no long term debt, there is clearly no opportunity to devalue this debt through
increases in future nominal interest rates.
Finally, in Aiyagari et al (2002), only real debt of one period is traded, which implies:
ξt(st)/U1t(st) = at(st−1). (11)
In this case, the debt value at(st−1) cannot be altered contemporaneously.
9C. No Lending and Nominal Wealth-in-Advance Constraints
The no lending constraints ensure that the household’s bond holdings are non-negative. For ma-
turities k > 1, we have bk
t ≥ 0, while for one period nominal liabilities at ≥ 0. Finally, we have
a sequence of nominal wealth-in-advance constraints. Households must use some fraction of their
nominal wealth in the liquidity trading round to obtain the money necessary for cash good con-
sumption. Consequently, their total nominal wealth restricts their cash good consumption. Using
the measurability constraints (8), this restriction can be expressed as:
ξt(st) ≥ U1t(st)c1t(st). (12)
Proposition 2 formally characterizes competitive allocations; its proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. e∞ = {c1t,c2t,Lft,Lst}
∞
t=0 is a competitive allocation at {Ps,0,M0,{Bk
0}K
k=1} if
there exists a sequence of portfolio weights {at,{bk+1
t }K−1
k=1 }∞









such that the portfolio weight sequence and e∞ satisfy ∀ i,t,st, cit(st) > 0, (1−ρ)Lft(st) + ρLst(st)
∈ (0,T), (8), no lending: ∀k,t,st−1, bk
t(st−1) ≥ 0 and at(st−1) ≥ 0, (12) and
1. (Transactions)9 for all t, st,
U1t(st)/U2t(st) ≥ 1; (13)
2. (Resource) for all t, st,














µ − Lst(st)] = 0. (15)
If e∞ = {c1t,c2t,Lft,Lst}
∞





k=1} with each cit > 0













9This restriction is sometimes referred to as a no arbitrage constraint, since it implies non-negative nominal interest
rates. In our model, arbitrage between money and bonds is automatically precluded by the no borrowing restriction
on households. However, the cash-in-advance constraint continues to ensure that the marginal utility of cash goods
exceeds that of credit goods. Our “transactions” label indicates the source of the restriction.
10IV. Ramsey problems for incomplete and complete markets economies
The Ramsey problem with non-contingent nominal debt Given Proposition 2, the optimal
















βtU(c1t,c2t,(1 − ρ)Lf,t + ρLs,t)
 
(RP)







Ps0, for all t, c1t,c2t ≥ 0 and (1 − ρ)Lft + ρLst ∈ [0,T], (8), no
lending and (12)-(15).
The Ramsey problem with complete markets Before analyzing (RP) in detail, we brieﬂy
turn to the benchmark complete markets economy. In this the government faces no restrictions on
lending and can trade contingent claims. The corresponding Ramsey problem is essentially that
considered by Siu (2004) and others. We merely state two key properties of its solution.
Proposition 3. Under our assumed preferences, after period 0: 1) the Friedman rule holds and
U1t = U2t, 2) ﬂexible price ﬁrms set their prices equal to those of sticky price ﬁrms and Nt = 1.
Thus, when markets are complete, optimal policy implies nominal yields equal to zero at all
maturities and an absence of inﬂation surprises, i.e. Pt/Pt−1 is st−1-measurable, t ≥ 1.
Comparing policy in incomplete and complete markets economies It is convenient to
rewrite the measurability constraints (8) in matrix form. Given an allocation, let Ξt(st−1) be
the N × 1 vector with n-th element ξt(st−1, ˆ sn)/U1t(st−1, ˆ sn); let Ψt(st−1) be the N × K matrix




t+1(st−1, ˆ sn). The measurability constraints may be restated as, ∀ t, st−1,
Ξt(st−1) ∈ Span(Ψt(st−1)). (16)
It follows from Proposition 3 that when markets are complete, the optimal continuation allocation
sets each Ψt(st−1), t ≥ 1, equal to the unit matrix. By (16), implementation of this allocation in
the nominal debt economy is only possible if its surplus values ξt(st)/U1t(st) are st−1-measurable.
Typically, this is not true and the optimal complete markets allocation cannot be implemented with
non-contingent nominal debt. The logic is simple: this allocation usually requires that ﬁscal shocks
11be hedged and liability values varied, yet it also precludes state-contingent variations in interest
rates and inﬂation. The latter are precisely the means by which hedging is attained in an economy
with non-contingent nominal debt. At the optimal complete markets allocation all nominal assets
(regardless of maturity) have the same risk free return and no ﬁscal hedging is possible.
Although, the optimal complete markets allocation does not usually satisfy the measurability
constraints, there are arbitrarily small perturbations of it that do. Small, state-speciﬁc substitutions
of cash for credit good consumption at the optimal complete markets allocation can be used to
perturb the matrices Ψt(st−1) so that (16) holds. However, while allocations very close to the
optimal complete markets one can be implemented in non-contingent nominal debt economies,
their implementation usually requires very large negative (and positive) asset positions at some
maturities. Such positions are needed to obtain suﬃcient hedging oﬀ of the small variations in
interest rates and inﬂation implied by the perturbation. Clearly, restrictions on short selling in
general, and our no lending constraints in particular, prevent the government from obtaining large
negative asset positions. In doing so they usually preclude allocations in a neighborhood of the
optimal complete markets one.
Comparing policy in economies with real and nominal incompleteness Buera and Nicol-
ini (2004) and Angeletos (2002) consider economies in which the government can trade real non-
contingent claims of various maturities. Angeletos shows that generically the optimal complete
markets allocation can be implemented with non-contingent real debt if the number of maturities
traded exceeds the number of states. However, the calibrated examples of Buera and Nicolini sug-
gest that the government may need to take large debt positions to achieve this implementation.
Buera and Nicolini regard this as a problem. In contrast, with non-contingent nominal debt, the
optimal complete markets allocation can not usually be implemented since, as noted, it implies that
all nominal assets oﬀer the same riskless return. Moreover, since the implementation of allocations
close to the optimal complete markets one typically requires extreme asset market positions, the
problem identiﬁed by Buera and Nicolini is more severe in an economy with nominal debt.
V. Optimal hedging with nominal incompleteness
This section uses an analytically tractable example to isolate a key motive for issuing long term
debt. Such debt permits the postponement of distortions to private consumption decisions.
12General Case Let −ω0 and −ωt, t > 0, denote respectively the Lagrange multipliers on the im-
plementability and t-th period measurability constraints in (RP). Deﬁne the cumulative multiplier
ψt := −
 t
j=0 ωj; ψt is the shadow value of the government’s continuation primary surplus stream.
ωt represents a shock to ψt and may be interpreted as a measure of the government’s additional
desire for funds in period t. We leave the underlying source of shocks unspeciﬁed; they may perturb
government spending, productivity or both. In the subsequent discussion, the essential requirement
is that shocks induce variation in the shadow value of the primary surplus stream across states.
Their exact source is irrelevant.
The ﬁrst order conditions from Problem (RP) reveal the basic cost-hedging tradeoﬀ that inﬂu-















t is a normalized multiplier from (k,t)-th no no lending constraint. Mt+1 = β
U1t+1ψt+1
U1tψt has





















t+1 is the gross return on the k-th period nominal debt and R
f
t+1 is the riskless rate implied by
the government’s stochastic discount factor (i.e. 1/Et[Mt+1]). The CAPM equation (18) formalizes
the tradeoﬀ between the expected cost and the hedging beneﬁts of borrowing at a speciﬁc maturity.
Larger hedging beneﬁts (as captured by the covariance term in (18)) are associated with either a
larger cost premium (Et[Rk
t+1] − R
f
t+1) or a reduced no lending shadow price ˆ κk
t .
Suppose that U(c1,c2,l) = (1−γ)log(c1)+γ log(c2)+v(l) for some smooth, concave, decreasing
function v. This functional form simpliﬁes the analysis by rendering the primary surplus values in
the measurability constraints independent of the consumption allocation. We can then focus on
the implications of this allocation for liability values and the hedging properties of nominal debt.
The ﬁrst order conditions for cit(st), i = 1,2 may now be combined to give:



















is the t − j-th period
value of the government’s liabilities and for t− j < 0, Γt−j := 0. Equation (19) describes the costs
and beneﬁts of a small substitution of cash for credit goods at date t. The term on the left hand
side gives the utility cost of the substitution, while those terms on the right hand side capture the
shadow beneﬁts from relaxing the transactions constraint and from hedging. Note that the marginal
hedging beneﬁt term, the ﬁnal term on the right hand side, is a weighted sum of the measurability
shadow prices {ωt−j}K−2
j=0 , where the weights describe the eﬀect of the cash-credit substitution on
government’s liability values. If
 K−2
j=0 β−jδt,t−j(st−1)ωt−j(st−j) > 0, then U1t(st) − U2t(st) > 0
and the st-nominal interest is positive, otherwise, the nominal interest rate is 0.
Two features of optimal interest rate policy become apparent in (19). First, nominal interest
rates in period t are used to adjust liability values and hedge shocks in multiple past periods as well
as the present. In this way, the eﬀect of a shock on nominal interest rates is propagated over time.
Second, the weight attached to ωt−j is scaled by β−j. Other things equal, this scaling implies that
current nominal interest rates are more sensitive to funding need shocks further back in the past
(but within the maturity of the government’s portfolio). The logic behind this is straightforward.
A perturbation to the cash-credit allocation at date t + k, confers a hedging beneﬁt at t. Since
the nominal debt price is given by the (distorted) conditional expectation of the product of cash-
credit marginal rates of substitution (MRS’s) over the term of the debt, a perturbation at t+k is,
potentially, as eﬀective at altering the price of outstanding debt (with maturity in excess of k + 2)
as a perturbation at t. However, the utility cost of the former perturbation is not born for k periods
and is correspondingly discounted. This is a force for the optimal postponement of the nominal
interest rate adjustments used in the hedging of shocks; the relative scaling in (19) captures this.
It is also a force for the use of longer term debt; such debt permits greater postponement. To see
this more explicitly, consider the following example.
Example We make two additional simplifying assumptions. First, we suppose that there is a
single shock s at date 1 drawn from S = {  s1,  s2}. In the remainder of this section all variables
dated t ≥ 1 will be indexed by this shock. Again, the exact source of the shock is not important,
we merely require that it introduces stochastic variation into the measurability constraint shadow
prices. Since there are no shocks drawn in later periods, t > 1, ωt = 0. Second, we suppose that
there is no debt of maturity greater than one outstanding in period 0 so that for all t = 1,...,K−2,
14δt,0(st−1) = 0. These assumptions disentangle the eﬀects of multiple shocks, they imply that
variations in nominal interest rates in periods t ≥ 1 are used solely to hedge the period 1 shock
and that their variation has no implications for asset prices prior to period 1. We retain the utility
function U(c1,c2,l) = (1 − γ)logc1 + γ logc2 + v(l).
Using the formulas for debt prices, the ﬁrst order condition for the k-th maturity portfolio











U11(s)ω1(s)π(s) + κk. (20)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (20) is the expected product of the normalized period 1 debt
price (the bracketed term) and U11(s)ω1(s). This term incorporates the period 1 hedging beneﬁts
of k maturity debt. Apart from knife-edge cases, ω1(s′) > 0 > ω1(s′′) for some pair s′,s′′ and there
is stochastic variation in the government’s ex post desire for funds. Manipulation of (20) and the
ﬁrst order conditions for consumption reveals that it is weakly optimal to use some of the longest
term debt and that for each date t = 1,    ,K − 1,
U2t(s′)
U1t(s′) > 1 =
U2t(s′′)
U1t(s′′). Intuitively, longer term
debt gives the government greater ﬂexibility in using nominal interest rates to hedge the shock s.
Furthermore, this hedging is achieved through increases in nominal interest rates over the term of
the outstanding debt in period 1 when the government’s ex post desire for funds is high. It is then
immediate that the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (20) is increasing in k and so, in fact, it is
strictly optimal to use only the longest term debt.
We now consider the pattern of nominal interest rates in state s′. In the current example,
equation (19) reduces to:
U1t(s) − U2t(s) = −ηt(s)[U11t(s) + U22t(s)] − β−(t−1)δt,1(s)ω1(s), (21)




















for some increasing and convex function H with H(0) = 1. It follows that when ω1(s) > 0, nominal
interest rates are increasing in t, for t = 2,    ,K. Otherwise, they are set to 0. Put diﬀerently,
when the government receives a shock to the shadow value of its primary surplus stream, the
15increases in cash-credit MRS’s necessary to devalue its liabilities are postponed until later in the
term of the debt.
The following results formalize these arguments; their proofs are supplied in the appendix.
Lemma 4. (Use of long term debt) Suppose that the optimal multipliers satisfy ω0 > 0 and ω1(s) >
0 > ω1(s′), some pair s,s′ ∈ S, then the government uses only the longest term debt. When
ω1(s) > 0, the nominal interest rate is greater than zero in periods t = 2,    ,K − 1.
Lemma 5. (Postponement eﬀect) Suppose that the optimal multipliers satisfy ω0 > 0 and ω1(s) >
0 > ω1(s′). In the state s such that ω1(s) > 0, Q1
t+1(s) < Q1
t(s), k = 1,    ,K − 1. For t > K − 1,
Q1
t(s) = 1. In the state s such that ω1(s) < 0, Q1
t(s) = 1 for all t.
Implications for the yield curve and term premia Lemma 5 has immediate implications
for the yield curve. Since all uncertainty is resolved at date 1, the expectations hypothesis holds




1+j. It follows that if ω1(s) ≤ 0, then the date 1 yield
curve remains at zero. On the other hand, if ω1(s) > 0, the yield curve rises and steepens over the
horizon k = 1,    ,K − 1. Yields at maturities greater than K − 1 asymptote towards zero as the
maturity increases. Thus, the yield curve is hump shaped, with the hump occurring at maturity
K−1. As time passes and the debt outstanding at the time of the shock matures, the hump occurs
at a progressively shorter maturity, before disappearing at date K.






states is increasing in the debt’s maturity k, until k = K − 1. This contributes to a date 0 term
premium that is increasing in the maturity of the debt until k = K −1. Despite the relative cost of
K-maturity debt, the government uses it because it is able to postpone the distortions associated
with ﬁscal hedging.
VI. A recursive formulation
We now look for a recursive formulation of (RP). This formulation must ensure that contin-
uation choices attain the primary surplus and liability values implied by past implementabil-






t+1(st)]Nt(st) = Λt(st) + βφt+1(st), (23)




. Additionally, (12) can be recast in terms of φt+1 as:
Λt(st) + βφt+1(st) ≥ U1t(st)c1t(st). (24)
The tuple {φt+1,{Dk
t+1}K−1
k=1 } may be interpreted as a list of implicit “promises” made by the
government at t concerning the value of its primary surplus stream and of speciﬁc bonds within its
portfolio. Satisfaction of (23) requires that future choices implement these promises. Our earlier
deﬁnitions imply that the φt and Dk







t := 1 and for k = 2,    ,K − 1,
Dk










Our recursive approach to (RP) treats the variables xt = {st−1,φt,{Dk
t }K−1
k=1 } as state variables
that summarize relevant aspects of the past history of the economy and ensure that past constraints
are satisﬁed. As with most Ramsey problems, the initial period of (RP) diﬀers from subsequent
ones. In the initial period, the government faces a ﬁxed vector of portfolio weights {a0,{bk+1
0 }K−1
k=1 }
rather than a ﬁxed vector of state variables x0. In later periods, this is reversed: the government
can be modeled as entering period t ≥ 1 with a state vector xt and choosing portfolio weights
{at,{bk+1
t }K−1
k=1 } along with a current allocation {c1t,c2t,Lft,Lst} and a continuation state vector
xt+1. Thus, the continuation of the Ramsey problem is recursive in the state variables {xt}. In the
remainder of this section, we formally state the associated dynamic programming problem. The
policy functions that solve this problem can be used to generate an optimal continuation allocation
along with corresponding optimal policies.10
Let X denote the set of tuples {s,φ,{Dk}K−1
k=2 } that are attained by some continuation compet-
itive allocation in its initial period. We collect recursive versions of the constraints that deﬁne a
competitive allocation into a correspondence Γ. Given an inherited tuple of state variables, these
constraints ensure that a current consumption-labor allocation and tuple of future state variables
are consistent with the requirements of a competitive allocation.
Deﬁnition 6. Let Γ(s,φ,{Dk}K−1
k=2 ) equal all tuples {a,{bk}K
k=2,c1, c2, Lf, Ls,φ′, {Dk′}K−1
k=2 } that
10LSY (2006) formally demonstrate the recursivity of the continuation Ramsey problem in these state variables.
17satisfy for each s′, ci(s′) ≥ 0, i = 1,2, (1 − ρ)Lf(s′) + ρLs(s′) ∈ [0,L], (13)-(15), a ≥ 0, bk ≥ 0,
(23)-(26) and for each s′ (s′,φ′(s′),{Dk′(s′)}K−1
k=2 ) ∈ X.
The correspondence Γ provides the constraint set for our dynamic programming problem:
V (s,φ,{Dk}K−1




Es[U(c1,c2,(1 − ρ)Lf + ρLs) + βV (s′,φ′,{Dk′}K−1
k=2 )]. (27)
Problem (27) can be solved numerically and its computed policy functions used to obtain the
optimal continuation Ramsey allocation along with the supporting optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policies at each initial state vector {s0,φ1,{Dk
1}K−1
k=2 }. We pursue this approach in Section VII.
Before doing so, we provide an example that permits an analytical solution and that builds intuition.
VII. A Calibrated Example
A. Numerical method and parameter values
Numerical method We solve the dynamic programming problem (27) numerically and then
back out the implied optimal policies. The state space X for these problems is endogenous and of
dimension K. In our calculations we restrict the state space to be a K-dimensional rectangular
set ˜ X and check that enlarging ˜ X does not signiﬁcantly alter the numerical results we report. The
dynamic programming problem is solved by a value iteration. The main computational diﬃculty
concerns the dimension of the state space which is increasing in the maximal debt maturity K.
To enable us to solve problems with a maturity structure of reasonable length, we use Smolyak’s
algorithm to approximate the government’s value function on a sparse grid ﬁtted to ˜ X. For further
details on Smolyak’s algorithm see Krueger and Kubler (2004).
Calibration To permit comparability of our results to those in Siu (2004) and Chari et al (1991),
we compute a baseline case with parameter values that are close to theirs. In this baseline case, we









φ + ψ log(T − l). (28)
The preference parameters γ, φ and β are set to 0.58, 0.79 and 0.96; ψ is chosen so that approxi-
mately 30% of an agent’s time is spent working. The values of γ and φ are similar to those used
18by Siu (2004) and Chari et al (1991). We follow Siu (2004) and set the production parameters α,
µ and ρ to 1.0, 1.05 and 0.08 respectively. Government spending takes on two values G and G.
The government spending process has a mean of around 20% of GDP in a complete markets model
with a debt to GDP ratio of 60%. We set the standard deviation of this process to be 6.7% and
its autocorrelation coeﬃcient to 0.95. These values are close to those estimated from the data and
conform to the values used in Siu.11
Our baseline case sets the maximal maturity K to 7. We contrast this with variations of
the model in which K is less than 7 and conjecture that all of the eﬀects we identify would be
quantitatively reinforced if K were raised above 7.
B. Results
B.1. Maturity structure
All numerical calculations conﬁrm that the government uses only the longest maturity debt avail-
able. In each hedging trading round, it funds its deﬁcit and reﬁnances its portfolio with debt of
maturity K. In the remainder of this section, we focus on the implications of optimal policy for
nominal interest rates, inﬂation and debt holding returns. We illustrate these implications with
short simulations that highlight the consequences of particular sequences of shocks and with sample
moments from long simulations.
B.2. Short simulations
This section presents short simulations. In each, low spending shocks are drawn until period 4, high
spending shocks from period 5 until 4 + TG and low spending shocks thereafter. The government
has an initial debt to output ratio of about 40%.
Nominal interest rates Figure 1 shows several sample paths for one period nominal interest
rates. The ﬁgure indicates that a transition from low to high spending at date t is associated with
an accumulation of nominal interest rates until min(t + TG,t + K − 1), i.e. until the spell of high
spending shocks ends or until the maturity date of debt outstanding at t is reached. In the ﬁrst
case, the nominal interest rate quickly falls back to 0; in the second (see the TG = 10 line in the
11Given space constraints, we report only results from an economy with government spending shocks. We have
obtained similar quantitative results in an economy with productivity shocks.
19ﬁgure), it falls to a positive number, falling back to 0 only when the high spending spell ﬁnally
comes to an end.
Figure 1. One period nominal interest rates














































Higher future interest rates after a transition from low to high spending deliver capital losses
to long term debt holders and contribute to ﬁscal hedging. The particular pattern of interest rates
across time and states reﬂects postponement and eﬀorts to hedge shocks in multiple periods. The
highest nominal interest rates occur later in the term of the debt so postponing their costs and after
several consecutive high spending shocks when they can contribute to hedging in multiple periods.
The qualitative eﬀects described above occur in economies with shorter maximal debt maturities
K = 3,    ,6, but they are quantitatively damped. For example, when K = 3 (and TG = 10), the
nominal interest rate peaks at 0.3% rather than 0.83%.






for short TG = 1 and long TG = 10 spells of high spending shocks. When TG = 1, a small positive
inﬂation innovation in period 5 (of about 0.2%), is followed by a small negative innovation in the
next period. These innovations contribute to ﬁscal hedging by devaluing and then revaluing the
government’s portfolio as the high spending spell begins and ends. When TG = 10, a similar
positive innovation in period 5, is followed by an increase in both realized and expected inﬂation
over periods 7-10. The latter increase is associated with the corresponding rise in nominal interest
rates at this time.12 As the rise in nominal interest rates is attenuated after period 11, so too is
that in expected and realized inﬂation. When the high spending spell comes to an end then, as in
the TG = 1 case, there is a small negative inﬂation innovation.
12A risk-adjusted Fisher equation holds: βEt[U1t+1/U1t] Et[Pt/Pt+1] Q
1
t + β Covt[U1t+1/U1t,Pt/Pt+1] = 1.
20Figure 2. Inﬂation, TG = 1, TG = 10




































Holding returns Collectively, these changes in nominal interest rates and innovations in
inﬂation deliver real capital gains and losses to households. In doing so they alter realized real
holding returns and allow the government to hedge shocks. Figure 3 shows paths for realized
and conditional expected real holding returns on the government’s debt portfolio for TG = 1 and
TG = 10. When a low government spending shock persists realized real holding returns are slightly
below their expected level, when a high shock persists realized real holding returns are slightly above
this level, indicating a moderate degree of hedging at these times. More signiﬁcant adjustments
in realized holding returns coincide with transitions from low to high and high to low government
spending shock states. Both when TG = 1 and when it equals 10, the realized holding return falls
from 4.1% to 2.4% at the onset of the high government spending spell. The eﬀect of this is to reduce
the real value of the government’s liabilities by about 0.7% of GDP. In the TG = 1 (resp. TG = 10)
case, the realized real holding return jumps to 5.3% (resp. 5.8%) on the reverse transition.
Yield curves Figure 4 plots the evolution of the yield curve as the economy is hit by a
series of high spending shocks. Initially, at t = 4, government spending is low and the yield curve
(dotted line) is fairly ﬂat and close to zero. With the realization of the ﬁrst high spending shock at
t = 5, nominal interest rates rise at all maturities (solid line). Consistent with the pattern of short
run nominal interest rates and our earlier simple example, the increase is greatest at the longest
outstanding maturity K − 1 = 6. Thus, the yield curve is hump shaped, tilting upwards over
maturities k = 1 to K − 1 and downwards from K − 1 onwards. Over periods 6 to 10, the hump
rises and passes to lower maturities. Once all initially outstanding debt has matured in period 11,
the yield curve falls back to a lower level and adopts a ﬂatter shape (solid-circle line).
21Figure 3. Debt holding returns, TG = 1, TG = 10
































Figure 4. Yield curves




























In this section we report results from long simulations of various economies. Each simulation is of
length Tsample = 20,000.
Interest rate variation and debt levels Figure 5 shows simulated values for the debt to output
ratio (dashed line) and nominal interest rates (solid line) for the ﬁrst 1,000 periods of the baseline
economy with K = 7. The ﬁgure shows that the volatility of nominal interest rates is increasing in
the debt level. At high debt levels a given interest rate volatility induces greater absolute variation
in the government’s total liability value and provides a more eﬀective hedge against ﬁscal shocks.
The extent of ﬁscal hedging Let ∆V Bt denote the variation in the real value of the govern-












t . Table 1
22Figure 5. Debt levels and nominal interest rates






















































shows long simulation sample averages of ∆V Bt for economies with K = 1 and K = 7 under two
diﬀerent normalizations. The ﬁrst normalization provides a measure of the extent of ﬁscal hedging
relative to the size of the economy, variations in portfolio values are divided by the conditional




Et−1[Yt], are given in
the ﬁrst row of the table with the next two rows breaking these variations down into components
that come from nominal capital losses and from contemporaneous inﬂations. The second normal-
ization gives a measure of the extent of ﬁscal hedging relative to the optimal amount in a complete
markets economy with the same primary surplus value.13 We denote sample moments under this
normalization by ∆V B/∆V BC.
The results in Table 1 may be summarized as follows. First, our measures of ﬁscal hedging
increase 5-fold as the maximal debt maturity rises from 1 to 7. When K = 1, variations in portfolio
values are, on average, about 0.4% of GDP; when K = 7, these variations average about 2.1%
of GDP. Second, as K rises the extent to which ﬁscal hedging is obtained from movements in
debt prices rather than contemporaneous inﬂations increases. When K = 1, all hedging must
necessarily come from contemporaneous innovations in the price level; when K rises to 7, over
80% of the variation in average portfolio values comes from changes in debt prices. Finally, the
amount of ﬁscal hedging relative to the complete markets economy is quite small when K = 1
(△V B/△V BC = 4.7%), but is signiﬁcantly greater when K = 7, (△V B/△V BC = 24.4%).
13More precisely, the long simulation of a nominal debt model generates a sequence of expected primary surplus
values {φt}
Tsample
t=1 . These values serve as state variables in recursive formulations of both the nominal debt and the
complete markets models. We use the policy functions from the latter to compute complete markets variations in real
portfolio values at each φt generated along the sample path of a nominal debt economy. These portfolio variations
are then used to normalize those from the nominal debt economy.
23Table 1: Financing Government Spending
K = 1 K = 7
△V B/Y 0.393 2.17
change in inﬂation 0.393 0.386
change in price of debt 0.000 1.78
△V B/△V BC 4.70 24.4
Variability and persistence of inﬂation and interest rates Table 2 reports standard devia-
tions, autocorrelations and correlations with government spending shocks for inﬂation and nominal
interest rates from long simulations of economies with K = 1, 3 and 7. The table indicates that all
of these statistics are increasing in the maximal debt maturity. Thus, ﬁscal hedging in economies
with higher maximal debt maturities leads to inﬂation and interest rate processes that are more
volatile, persistent and correlated with spending shocks.
Table 2: Statistics from Long Simulations
K = 1 K = 3 K = 7
inﬂation
st. deviation 0.227 0.290 0.334
autocorrelation 0.315 0.430 0.655
correlation with G-shock 0.167 0.369 0.589
1-period nom. interest rate
st. deviation 0.168 0.181 0.364
autocorrelation 0.081 0.152 0.713
correlation with G-shock -0.396 0.420 0.509
Welfare Increasing the maximal feasible debt maturity K provides positive, but small increases
in welfare. Let (a0,s) be an initial state for the Ramsey problem (RP) with K = 1 and de-
note the corresponding optimal household allocation by {c1t(a0,s),c2t(a0,s),lt(a0,s)}∞
t=0. De-
ﬁne W(a0,s) to be the optimal payoﬀ to household in an economy with K = 7 if the initial
state is (a0,s) and let ∆(a0,s) be such that W(a0,s) = Es
 ∞
t=0 βtU((1 + ∆(a0,s))c1t(a0,s),(1 +
∆(a0,s))c2t(a0,s),lt(a0,s)), i.e. ∆(a0,s) is the proportional increase in the K = 1 optimal con-
sumption allocation (at (a0,s)) necessary to yield the same payoﬀ as in the K = 7 economy.
∆ × 100% varies between 0.02% and 0.1% with larger values at higher initial debt values.
24C. Sensitivity Analysis
Here, we brieﬂy describe the sensitivity of our results to changes in some key parameters. All
changes in sample moments that we report are from long simulations and are relative to the baseline
long simulation. Throughout, we assume the government can trade debt of up to 7 periods maturity.
Volatility of shocks When government spending shocks are more volatile the value of ﬁscal
hedging is enhanced. A doubling of the standard deviation of government spending shocks to 14%
causes a near doubling of the standard deviations of inﬂation and the one period nominal interest
rates in the long simulation. Their standard deviations rise from 0.334 to 0.668 and 0.36 to 0.71
respectively. The sample correlation coeﬃcients for inﬂation and government spending shocks rises
from 0.589 to 0.63, that for one period interest rates and the shocks rises from 0.51 to 0.57.
Cash-credit good elasticity of substitution Our baseline preferences assume a fairly high
elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods of about 4.8. When this is reduced, dis-
tortions to the cash-credit good margin are less costly and the government is prepared to distort
this margin more. For example, when preferences are log-log in cash and credit goods (and so have
a unit elasticity of substitution) the standard deviation of the one period nominal interest rate in
the long simulation rises is 0.70 (versus 0.36 in the baseline case); the correlation of one period
nominal interest rates with government spending shocks is 0.62 (versus a baseline value of 0.51).
VIII. Conclusion
We have explored optimal debt management and taxation when the government is restricted to
using non-contingent nominal debt of various maturities and is limited in its ability to lend. We
identify a postponement motive for using long term debt and ﬁnd that the government relies
almost exclusively on the longest term debt available in calibrated examples. Other contributors
have argued that the use of long term debt may raise the government’s ﬁnancing costs or expose
it to unnecessary risk. Their arguments have implicitly treated inﬂation and/ or the yield curve as
parameters. In our model, which endogenizes all prices, the holding return on long term nominal
debt is more volatile than that on short term debt. However, this volatility is deliberate and is used
to hedge ﬁscal shocks. Higher risk premia on long term debt are the analogues of insurance premia
paid by the government and are not per se a rationale for shortening the maturity structure.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Necessity Suppose {c1t,c2t,Lf,t,Ls,t}
∞







k=1 }. We show that it satisﬁes the conditions in the proposition.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that at the equilibrium bond prices households have no desire
to borrow. The interiority of the competitive allocation implies that the constraints ∀i, t, cit ≥ 0 and
26(1 − ρ)Lft +ρLst ∈ [0,T] are non-binding. We assume the existence of optimal Lagrange multipliers on the
households’ constraints. Let µt(st) denote the multiplier on the household’s period t cash-in-advance con-
straint. Similarly, let λt(st) and   λt(st) denote, respectively, the multipliers on the liquidity and hedging round
budget constraints. The transversality condition: limt→∞ βt E[λt(st) {   At(st) +
 K−1
k=0 Qk
t(st)   B
k+1
t (st)}] =
0. The ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and labor supply are:
c1t : {  λt(st) + µt(st)}Pt(st) = U1t(st) (A1)
c2t :   λt(st)Pt(st) = U2t(st) (A2)
lt :   λt(st)(1 − τt(st))
∂It
∂lt
(st) = −Ult(st). (A3)
The ﬁrst order conditions for each of money and bonds are:
  Mt : λt(st) = µt(st) +   λt(st) (A4)
Mt+1 :   λt(s
t) = βEst[λt+1] (A5)
  Bk
t : Qk
t(st)λt(st) =   Qk
t(st)  λt(st) (A6)
Bk
t+1 :   Qk
t(st)  λt(st) = βEst[Q
k−1
t+1 λt+1] (A7)




≥ 1. This establishes (13). Adding the household’s and
the government’s hedging round budget constraints and using the deﬁnition of ﬁrm proﬁts gives (14).






















θ(st) Lf,t(st)1−α. Combining this with (A8)










θ(st) Lft(st)1−α As in Siu (2004), this last expression, the ﬁrst order
condition from the sticky price ﬁrm’s problem and the household’s ﬁrst order conditions imply (15).
Next take the household’s hedging round budget constraint at t, multiply it by   λt(st), add µt(st)  Mt(st)





t(st)   Bk







t+1(st+1)   Bk
t+1(st+1) + {  λt+1(st+1) + µt+1(st+1)}  Mt+1(st+1)
 
. (A9)
Using the expressions for proﬁts from the intermediate goods ﬁrms problems, It(st)/Wt(st) = Υt(st). Iterat-












Pt(st) ] = ξt(st), where ξt(st) ≡ Est[
 ∞
j=0 βt+j{U1t+jc1t+j(st+j) + U2t+jc2t+j(st+j) +Ult+jΥt+j(st+j)}].







































Combining (A8), (A10), (A11) and the deﬁnitions at(st−1) = At(st−1)/Pst(st−1) and bk
t(st−1) = Bk
t (st−1)/
Pst(st−1), we have the implementability/ measurability constraints (8). The deﬁnitions of bk
t and at and
the fact that Bk
t ≥ 0 and At ≥ 0 gives the no lending constraints. Finally, from (8), the non-negativity
















c1t(st), and, hence, (12).
Sufficiency We construct a candidate competitive equilibrium from an allocation and a portfolio weight
sequence satisfying the conditions in the proposition. First we set prices. At date 0, Ps,0 is a parameter, while


























µ . These conditions allow us to recursively
recover all goods prices. For k > 0 and t ≥ 0, set the asset prices Qk








Also, for k > 0 and t ≥ 0, set the asset prices from the period t hedging round budget constraint to be
  Qk
t(st) = Dk
t+1(st). For t > 0, we set the portfolios purchased by households in the hedging round as follows.
The level of debt of k > 1 maturity is ﬁxed at Bk
t (st−1) = bk
t(st−1)Pst(st−1). Using the no lending constraint,
Bk
t (st−1) ≥ 0. Also by this constraint, at(st−1) ≥ 0, and we can choose Mt(st−1) ≥ 0 and B1
t (st−1) ≥ 0
28so that Mt(st−1)+ B1
t (st−1) = at(st−1)Pst(st−1). Let At(st−1) = at(st−1)Pst(st−1). Next we turn to the
portfolios purchased in the liquidity round. For t ≥ 0, the money supply is set to   Mt(st) = Pt(st)c1t(st).
From the measurability constraints (8), the above deﬁnitions of goods prices, asset prices and portfolios











U1t(st) ≥ c1t(st) =
  Mt(st)
Pt(st) . It follows that, at each date t, we can choose a non-negative debt portfolio
{   Bk
t (st)}K
k=1 ∈ RK
+ so that the liquidity round budget constraints hold with equality. Hence, the no lending,
liquidity round budget and cash-in-advance constraints are satisﬁed. The government’s debt holdings are
set equal to the household’s holdings of bonds.














Wt and the Lagrange multipliers to λtPt = U1t ≥ 0,   λtPt = U2t ≥ 0
and µtPt = U1t − U2t ≥ 0. It is then immediate that λt = µt +   λt, {  λt + µt}Pt = U1t,   λtPt = U2t and





, so that λt = βEst[λt+1].
Finally, the deﬁnitions of Qk
t,   Qk
t+1 and the multipliers gives Qk
tλt =   Qk
t+1  λt and   Qk
t+1  λt = βEst[Q
k−1
t+1λt+1].



















Hence, using the liquidity round budget constraint and the deﬁnitions of Qk
t(st) and   Qk




















Pt(st) to each side of
this equation, using the deﬁnition of ξt(st) and τt(st) and
  Mt(s
t)












= c1t(st) + c2t(st)− (1 − τt(st))It(st) +
β
U2t(st)Est[ξt+1(st+1)]. Then, using (A15) at t + 1, the deﬁnitions
of Qk
t+1,   Qk
tand Pt+1 and the condition U2t − βEt+1[ Pt































The hedging round budget constraint at t then follows from (A16) and the deﬁnition of   At(st).
By (8) and the interiority of the allocation, ξ0is ﬁnite. Using the deﬁnition of ξt, we have for all T,
E[ξ0] = E[
 ∞
t=0 βt{U1tc1t+U2tc2t+UltΥt}] = E[
 T
t=0 βt{U1tc1t+U2tc2t+UltΥt}] + βT+1E[ξT+1]. Taking










PT+1 )] = 0 which conﬁrms the transversality condition. Hence, the allocation is
feasible and optimal for households at the derived prices and tax rates. The household’s budget constraints,
the resource constraint and the deﬁnitions of Agt and Bgt ensure that the government’s budget constraints
are satisﬁed. It is easy to verify that the derived choices of ﬁrms satisfy their ﬁrst order conditions and are
29optimal. ￿




k=2} denote an optimal portfolio. Since φ1 > 0, either a∗
1 > 0 or bk∗
1 > 0 for some k. Let ˆ k
denote the smallest k such that for all k > ˆ k, bk∗
1 = 0. Suppose ˆ k < K. Then, for t ≥ max{2,ˆ k}, the ﬁrst
order condition for cit reduces to 0 = Uit + ηt [U1it − U2it] − χt. If U1t > U2t, then ηt = 0 and this ﬁrst
order condition implies that each Uit = χt. We deduce that in fact U1t = U2t. It then follows from the






1 = 0 or, if ˆ k = 1, bK
1 = a∗
1 and a1 = 0. All other portfolio weights remain the same.













where κk+1 ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the corresponding no lending constraint. Wlog assume bK∗
1 > 0,
so that from (A17) that either A) ω1(s) = 0 for each s or B) ω1(s) > 0 > ω1(s′) for some pair s, s′. We
assume the latter. (In fact, Case A holds only in knife edge cases). Now, suppose bk∗







U1j(s)π(s) = 0. The combined ﬁrst order condition for c1t and c2t,
t ∈ {2,    ,K − 1} , (21) implies that U1t − U2t > 0 if and only if ω1 > 0, and U1t − U2t = 0 otherwise.
Hence, −
 








U1j(s) π(s) > 0. But this contradicts the ﬁrst order
condition (A17) at k + 1 = K. Thus, bk∗
1 = 0 for k < K. By a similar argument, using the relevant ﬁrst
order condition, a∗
1 = 0 as well. The lemma is proven. ￿
Proof of Lemma 5 It follows from the proof of Lemma 4, that if ω1(s) ≤ 0 or t ≥ K, then U1t(s) =
U2t(s) and Q1
t(s) = 1; if ω1(s) > 0 and t = 2,    ,K − 1, then U1t(s) − U2t(s) > 0 and Q1
t(s) < 1. Also,
a1,bk
1 = 0 at the optimal allocation. Using the ﬁrst order conditions for c1t and c2t, when ω1(s) > 0 and


















Since β ∈ (0,1) and ω1 > 0, we deduce that for t = 2,    ,K − 2,
U1t+1
U2t+1 > U1t
U2t. Hence, 1 > Q1
t > Q1
t+1, for
t = 2,    ,K −2. If Q1


























, t = 2,    ,K − 2. (A19)
Thus, Q1
t+1 < Q1
t for t = 1,    ,K − 2. ￿
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